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Abstract
Most encrypted data formats, such as PGP, leak sub-
stantial metadata from their plaintext headers, such
as the format version, the encryption schemes used,
number of recipients who can decrypt the data, and
even the identities of these recipients. This leakage
can pose security and privacy risks to users, e.g., by
revealing the full membership of a group of collabo-
rators from a single encrypted e-mail, or by enabling
an eavesdropper to fingerprint the precise encryption-
software version and configuration the sender used.
We propose to improve security and privacy hygiene
by designing future encrypted data formats such
that anyone without a relevant decryption key can-
not learn anything at all from a ciphertext, apart
from its length, and as little as possible even from
that. We present Padded Uniform Random Blobs or
PURBs, an encrypted format that strongly mini-
mizes a ciphertext’s leakage via metadata or length.
Without a decryption key, a PURB is indistinguish-
able from a uniform random bit string. Legitimate
recipients can efficiently decrypt the PURB, even
when it is encrypted for any number of recipients’
public keys and/or passwords, and when these pub-
lic keys are from different cryptographic schemes.
PURBs use a novel padding scheme to reduce poten-
tial information-leakage via the ciphertext’s length L
to the asymptotic minimum of O(log logL) bits, com-
parable to padding to a power of two, but with a
much lower padding overhead of at most 12%, which
decreases with larger payloads.
*Both are corresponding authors and share first authorship.
1 Introduction
Traditional data-encryption schemes and protocols
aim only at protecting their payload while re-
lated metadata is being exposed. Formats, such as
PGP [64], often reveal in cleartext message head-
ers the public-key fingerprints of the intended recip-
ients, the algorithm used for encryption, and the ac-
tual length of the payload. Protocols for secure com-
munication often leak information during a key-and-
algorithm agreement phase: for example, in the hand-
shake phase of TLS [24], the protocol version, a cho-
sen cipher-suite, and the public keys of the parties
are exchanged in cleartext. This metadata exposure
is assumed to be non-security sensitive but important
for efficiency.
However, researchers consistently show that such
metadata can be exploited by an attacker to retrieve
information about communication content or pat-
terns. In particular, the attacker might be able to fin-
gerprint users [40, 51] and the applications used [63].
Using traffic analysis [21], an attacker might be able
to infer user-visited websites [21, 39, 25, 56, 57] or to
identify the videos that a user watches [43, 49, 44].
On VoIP, it can be used to infer the geo-location [35],
the spoken language [61], or the voice activity of
users [19]. The side-channel leaks of data compres-
sion [32] make several attacks on SSL possible [47, 26,
7]. The lack of proper padding might enable an ac-
tive attacker to learn the length of the user’s password
from TLS [53] or QUIC [1] traffic. In social networks,
metadata can be used to draw conclusions on users’
actions [28], whereas telephone metadata has been
shown to be sufficient for user re-identification and for
determining home locations [36]. Furthermore, by ob-
serving the format of the packets, oppressive regimes
can infer which technology is used and use this infor-
mation for the purposes of incrimination or censor-
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ship, e.g., most TCP packets of Tor traffic are 586
bytes due to the standard Tor cell size [29].
To tackle these security and privacy threats, we de-
veloped Padded Uniform Random Blobs (PURBs), a
novel approach to designing encrypted-data formats.
A PURB incorporates application content and meta-
data into a single encrypted blob that is indistinguish-
able from a random string and is extended to a cer-
tain size by using a novel padding scheme to even fur-
ther reduce information leakage. In particular, unlike
other approaches (PGP, TLS, etc.), PURBs do not
leak the encryption scheme used, who or how many
recipients can decrypt it, or what application or soft-
ware version created it. In this paper, we make the
following contributions:
First, we present a content-and-metadata encryp-
tion scheme that supports any number of recipients
who can use either shared passwords or public-private
key pairs, and that supports simultaneous use of mul-
tiple cryptographic suites. The main challenge that
we address is providing efficient decryption to re-
cipients who do not have any cleartext markers. If
efficiency was of no importance, the problem would
be trivial: The sender could discard all the metadata
and the recipient would parse the encrypted data by
using every possible structure and/or cipher suite.
However, adoption by the real-world heavily depends
on how efficient a given scheme is and what cryp-
tographic agility it provides. PURB is a combina-
tion of a variable-sized encrypted header of a special
structure, containing metadata, and a symmetrically-
encrypted payload. The header’s structure enables ef-
ficient decoding by legitimate recipients via a minimal
number of trial-decryption steps. It also facilitates the
seamless addition and removal of supported cipher
suites, yet it leaks no information to any third party
without a decryption key. We construct our scheme
starting with the standard construction of the Inte-
grated Encryption Scheme [2] and use the ideas of
multi-recipient public-key encryption [34, 9] as a part
of the multi-recipient development.
Second, to reduce information leakage from data
lengths, we developed Padme´, a padding scheme
that obfuscates the true length of data objects by
grouping files in sets that logarithmically increase in
their size. The scheme reduces information leakage
to O(log logL) bits where L denotes the data length
and retains the minimal practical space overhead for
a given asymptotic boundary. Padme´ enlarges files
by at most +12%, and less for increasing file sizes.
Our evaluation demonstrates that creating
a PURB ciphertext takes ˜380ms for 100 recipients
on consumer-grade hardware, using 10 different
cipher suites, and only 8ms for the most com-
mon single-recipient single-suite scenario. Yet our
implementation is in pure Go without assembly
optimization that could give a significant speed-up
to public-key operations. The decoding performance
is comparable to a typical PGP implementation, and
almost independent of the number of recipients (up
to 10,000) due to our design that limits the number
of costly operations. Then, we analyze real-world
data sets and show that, without padding, many
objects are trivially identifiable by their unique sizes
and that it remains an issue even after padding
to a fixed block size (e.g., with a block cipher in
CBC mode, or Tor cells). We show that Padme´ can
significantly reduce the number of objects uniquely
identifiable by their sizes: from 83% to 3% for 56k
Ubuntu packages, from 87% to 3% for 191k Youtube
videos, from 45% to 8% for 848k hard-drive user
files, and from 68% to 6% for 2.8k websites from the
Alexa top 1M list, with a mean overhead of 3%.
In summary, our main contributions are as follows:
• We introduce a novel encoding format for en-
crypted data. It reveals no metadata informa-
tion to observers who do not hold valid (symmet-
ric or asymmetric) decryption keys and supports
multi-recipient and multi-ciphersuite use cases.
• We introduce Padme´, a padding scheme that
addresses the challenge of avoiding information
leakage from data lengths and keeps size over-
heads low.
• We implement the PURBs encoding and
padding schemes, evaluate the performance of
the former against PGP and the efficiency of the
latter on real-world data sets.
2 Motivation and Background
We begin this section by giving examples of where
PURBs can be useful, and describe the Integrated
Encryption Scheme that we later use as a starting
point in our design.
2.1 Motivation and Applications
PURBs is a paradigm for designing encryption data
formats; it efficiently protects sensitive metadata.
Our goal is to define a general approach applicable to
most of the common data-encryption scenarios such
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that the techniques are flexible to the application or
communication type, the cryptographic algorithms
used, and to the number of participants involved. We
also seek to enhance plausible deniability such that
a user can deny that a PURB is created by a given
application or that she owns the key to decrypt it.
We envision at least several immediate applications
that would benefit from using PURBs.
E-mail Protection. E-mail systems traditionally
use PGP or S/MIME for encryption. However, their
packet formats expose a significant amount of meta-
data: an OpenPGP-encrypted packet has its format
version, the encryption method, the number and
public-key identities of the recipients, and the public-
key algorithm all stated in clear [18]. In addition,
the payload is only padded to the block size of a
symmetric-key algorithm used that, as we will show
in §5.2, does not provide any “size privacy”. Hence,
it is a suitable candidate for PURBs optimization, as
the current metadata-leakage will be minimized. Fur-
thermore, the e-mail traffic is normally sparse, hence
the PURBs overhead can be easily accommodated.
Initiation of Cryptographic Protocols. In most
cryptographic protocols, initial cipher-suite negotia-
tion, handshaking, and key exchange are normally
performed unencrypted. In TLS, an eavesdropper,
who monitors a connection “from the start”, can
learn the details of the cryptographic schemes used
and Server Name Indication (SNI) that enables her
to determine which specific web site, from the set
of all the web sites hosted behind the same server, a
client is connected to [24]. Some measures are already
taken in TLS 1.3 [46], however, they are only partial
and do not fully address the issue. PURBs would fa-
cilitate the fully-encrypted handshaking process from
the very start. PURBs assume that a client knows at
least one public key and a supported cipher-suite of
the server. That is already the case in the scenario
of the 0-RTT handshake mechanism of TLS 1.3 [45]
when the client resumes a previous connection. Or the
public key and the cipher suites can be obtained from
services enabling DNS-based authentication, such as
DANE [30].
Encrypted Disk Volumes. VeraCrypt1 is a disk-
encryption software that uses a block cipher to turn
a disk partition into an encrypted volume where the
partition’s free space is filled with random bits. It
supports the so-called hidden-volume feature – an en-
crypted volume can be placed as a partial payload of
1https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html
another primary volume. The hidden volume cannot
be distinguished from free space filled with random
bits. VeraCrypt already hides well metadata, due to
the use of a special block-cipher operation mode. But
the hiding is limited because it is only possible to cre-
ate a single hidden volume inside a primary one. This
creates a risk that a potential coercer would assume
by default that the hidden volume is present and the
claim of non-possession of the decryption keys would
be considered as a refusal to provide them. We envi-
sion PURBs as an alternative approach to disk en-
cryption. They could provide the same level of meta-
data protection but, at the same time, enhance the
plausible deniability, as there can be as many hidden
volumes in a PURB as needed. It would facilitate
the N+1 defense when a coercee can reveal up to
N “dummy” volumes, whereas the coercer would not
be able to confirm whether there are more of them or
not.
2.2 Integrated Encryption Scheme
The Integrated Encryption Scheme (IES) [2] is a
hybrid encryption scheme that enables the encryp-
tion of arbitrary message strings (unlike ElGamal
that requires the message to be a group element)
and the flexibility of underlying primitives. To send
an encrypted message, a sender first generates an
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key pair and uses the pub-
lic key of the recipient to derive a shared secret. The
choice of the Diffie-Hellman group is flexible, e.g., in-
teger groups or elliptic curves. The sender then relies
on a cryptographic hash function to derive the shared
keys used to encrypt the message with a symmetric-
key cipher and to compute a MAC using the encrypt-
then-mac approach. The resulting ciphertext is shown
in Figure 1.
pk
s enc(M) tagmac
Figure 1: Ciphertext output of an Integrated Encryp-
tion Scheme where pks is an ephemeral public key of
the sender, and tagmac and enc(M) are generated us-
ing the DH-derived keys.
The IES is proven secure against adaptive chosen-
ciphertext attacks (ind$-cca) when the underlying
symmetric encryption is ind$-cpa, and the MAC
and hash algorithms are universally unforgeable [2].
We use the idea of IES in our design, but we sub-
stitute the generic composition of encryption and
MAC algorithms with dedicated authenticated en-
3
cryption schemes that provide the same security guar-
antees [16].
3 Hiding Metadata
In this section, we introduce Padded Uniform Ran-
dom Blobs (PURBs): an encoding scheme for en-
crypted data and the accompanying metadata. We
begin by defining the notation, system and threat
models, followed by a sequence of strawman ap-
proaches that tackle different challenges on the path
towards the final system. More specifically, we start
with a scheme where ciphertexts are encrypted with
a shared secret and are addressed to a single recipi-
ent. We then improve it to support public-key opera-
tions with a single cipher suite, and finally present the
multi-recipient, multi-cipher-suite encoding scheme.
For each step, we also show that security is preserved
in our threat model.
3.1 Preliminaries
We summarize here the cryptographic preliminaries;
the full version is in Appendix A.1.
Let λ be a standard security parameter. Let Π =
(K, E ,D) be a ind$-cpa secure, deterministic nonce-
based authenticated encryption (AE) scheme [10, 48]
where K : K
$
← {0, 1}λ, ENK (m) and D
N
K(c) are key
generation, encryption and decryption algorithms re-
spectively, given a message m, a ciphertext c, and a
nonce N .
Let G be a cyclic finite group of prime order gener-
ated by the group element g where the DDH problem
is hard to solve (e.g., an elliptic curve or an integer
group). Let KeyGen(G, λ) : x
$
← {0, ..., |G|}, X ← gx
be an algorithm that generates the private-public key
pair (x,X).
Let Hide: G(1λ)→ {0, 1}λ be a mapping that en-
codes group elements of G to binary strings that are
indistinguishable from random bit strings of the same
length (e.g., Elligator [13], Elligator Squared [50, 4]).
Let Unhide: {0, 1}λ → G(1λ) be the counterpart to
Hide that decodes binary strings into group elements
of G. We require that Unhide(Hide(g)) = g for all
g ∈ G.
Let KDF : G(1λ) → {0, 1}λ be a key derivation
function [33] that converts a group element into a
bit string that can be used as a symmetric key.
Let PBKDF : {salt, password} → {0, 1}λ be a se-
cure password-based key-derivation function [41, 15],
a variant of KDF that converts a salt and a password
into a bit string that can be used as a key for sym-
metric encryption.
3.1.1 System Model
Let data be an application-level unit of data (e.g., a
file or network message). A sender wants to send an
encrypted version of data to one or more recipients.
We consider two main approaches for secure data ex-
changes:
(1) Via pre-shared secrets, where the sender shares
with the recipients long-term one-to-one passphrases
Sˆ1, ..., Sˆr that the participants can use in a password-
hashing scheme to derive ephemeral secrets S1, ..., Sr.
(2) Via public-key cryptography, where sender and
recipients derive ephemeral secrets Zi = KDF(X
yi) =
KDF(Yi
x) with x and X = gx denoting the fresh
private and public keys of the sender and yi and
Yi = g
yi being the private and public keys of recipient
i ∈ 0, ..., r.
In both scenarios, the sender uses the ephemeral
secrets S1, ..., Sr or Z1, ..., Zr to encrypt (parts of)
the PURB header using an AE scheme.
We refer to the tuple (G,Π, KDF) used in the PURB
generation as a cipher suite. This can be considered
similar to the notion of a cipher suite in TLS [24].
Replacing any component of a suite, such as the
used public-key algorithm, results in a different cip-
her suite.
3.1.2 Threat Model
We consider two types of adversaries. The first is an
adversary who does not hold a private key or a pass-
word valid for derivation of the ephemeral secret. The
second is a legitimate but malicious recipient who
might be one of several recipients. Naturally, a legit-
imate recipient has more capabilites because she (a)
can recover the plaintext payload and (b) can distin-
guish a PURB addressed to her from random bits by
checking whether she can decrypt it. In both cases,
the adversary is computationally bounded.
3.1.3 Security Goals
1. The content and all metadata must be protected
by the PURBs’ encoding. And the encoding out-
put must be ind$-cpa secure given an adver-
sary without a valid decryption key (indistin-
guishable from random bits under an adaptive
chosen-plaintext-and-IV attack).
2. A legitimate recipient of a PURB must not be
able to learn the identities of other recipients, al-
though she might learn the total number of them.
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Limitations. (1) The scheme is secure against quan-
tum computers if and only if all the encryption,
key agreement and hashing algorithms used are se-
cure against quantum computers. (2) Being non-
interactive, the scheme does not provide forward se-
crecy by default.
3.1.4 System Goals
1. PURBs must provide cryptographic agility: (1)
They should accommodate a single recipient as
well as N recipients, support encryption for a
recipient using a shared password or a public
key, and support different cipher suites; and (2)
adding and removing cipher suites must be seam-
less and must not affect other cipher suites.
2. PURBs’ encoding and decoding must be “rea-
sonably” efficient, in particular, the number of
expensive public-key operations should be mini-
mized; and there must not be an excessive space
overhead.
3.2 Single Passphrase
We begin by a simple case where a sender wants to
encrypt data by using a single long-term passphrase
Sˆ that is shared with a single recipient (e.g., out-
of-band via a secure channel). The sender and the
recipient use a standardized cipher suite that defines
the scheme components. A typical use-case would be
encrypting a file on a hard drive.
First, the sender generates a fresh symmetric key
K and a nonce N , and she computes the PURB
payload as ENK (data). Then, the sender generates a
random salt and derives the ephemeral secret S =
PBKDF(salt, Sˆ). The sender creates an entry point
(EP ) containing the session key K, the start position
of the payload and other potential metadata. Then,
the sender encrypts the EP using S and N . Finally,
the sender creates the PURB by concatenating the
four segments as shown in Figure 2.
N salt ENS (K,meta) E
N
K (data)
entry point payload
Figure 2: A PURB addressed to a single recipient
and encrypted with a passphrase-derived ephemeral
secret S.
Security Argument. All four segments of the
PURB are individually indistinguishable from ran-
dom bits: the nonce and salt due to the way they have
been generated, and the AE ciphertexts – jointly with
N – are required to be ind$-cpa secure. Reuse of the
same nonce for encryption with different keys have
been proven secure [9, Section 9]. Furthermore, dis-
covering correlation between any of the two segments
would imply breaking the security properties of the
primitives. For the detailed arguments, see §A.2.
3.3 Single Public Key, Single Suite
In many scenarios, people and services do not
use pre-shared secrets in order to establish se-
cure communication channels or encrypting data at
rest. They rely on public-key cryptography, instead,
to derive ephemeral secrets. Typically, either the
sender/initiator indicates in the file’s metadata in
cleartext for which public key this file has been en-
crypted (e.g., in PGP), or parties exchange public-
key certificates in clear during the communication
setup (e.g., in TLS). Both approaches, typically, leak
the identity of the receiver. To cover this use case, we
improve the previous strawman to enable the decryp-
tion of an entry point EP using a private key.
To expand our scheme to the public-key scenario,
we adopt the idea of a hybrid asymmetric-symmetric
scheme from IES (discussed in §2.2). Let (y, Y ) de-
note the recipient’s key pair. The sender now gen-
erates an ephemeral key pair (x,X), computes the
ephemeral secret Z = KDF(Y x), and then proceeds as
before, except encrypting K and metadata with Z in-
stead of S. The sender replaces the salt in the PURB
with her encoded ephemeral public key Hide(X),
where Hide(·) maps a group element to a random
bit string. The resulting PURB is shown in Figure 3.
N Hide(X) ENZ (K,meta) E
N
K (data)
encoded pk entry point payload
Figure 3: A PURB addressed to a single recipient
that uses a public key Y , where X is the public key of
the sender and Z = KDF(Y x) is the ephemeral secret.
Security Argument. The public key / entry point
/ payload is almost a canonical example of an IES ci-
phertext, proven to be ind$-cca secure [2]. The only
difference from the IES specification is that we use an
AE scheme instead of the generic encrypt-then-mac
composition but both approaches, if secure, provide
the same security guarantees [16]. As the output of
Hide is also indistinguishable from random bits, the
whole PURB is ind$-cpa secure. See §A.3 for the
detailed discussion.
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3.4 Multiple Public Keys, Single Suite
In certain cases, a message needs to be encrypted
under several public keys, e.g., in multicast commu-
nication or in mobile group-chats. We improve the
previous strawman by adding support for multiple
public keys that can belong to a single recipient or
multiple recipients. As before, we assume that all the
keys are of the same suite.
For the first step, we adopt the idea of multi-
recipient public-key encryption [34, 9] where the
sender generates a single key pair and uses it to de-
rive an ephemeral secret with each of the intended
recipients. The sender creates one entry point per re-
cipient, these entry points contain the same session
key and metadata but are encrypted with different
ephemeral secrets.
Layout Challenges. As PURBs’ goal is to prevent
metadata leakage, including the number of recipients,
a PURB cannot reveal how many entry points exist
in the header. Yet a legitimate recipient needs to have
a way to enumerate possible candidates for her entry
point. Hence, the primary challenge is to find a space-
efficient layout of entry points – with no cleartext
markers – such that the recipients are able to find
their segments efficiently.
Linear Approach. The most space-efficient ap-
proach is to place them sequentially. In fact,
OpenPGP suggests a similar approach for achiev-
ing better privacy [18, Section 5.1]. However, in this
case, decryption is inefficient: the recipients have to
sequentially attempt to decrypt each potential entry
point, before finding their own or reaching the end of
the PURB.
Fixed Hash-Table Approach. A more computa-
tionally efficient approach is to use a hash table of a
fixed size. The sender creates a hash table and places
each encrypted entry point there, identifying the cor-
responding position by hashing an ephemeral secret.
Once all the entry points are placed, the remaining
slots are filled with random bit strings, hence a third-
party is unable to deduce the number of recipients
(yet the upper bound, corresponding to the size of
the hash table, would be public information). This
approach, however, causes a significant space over-
head: in the most common scenario of a single recip-
ient, all the unpopulated slots are filled with random
bits and still transmitted. Additionally, there is now
a limit on the number of recipients.
Growing Hash-Tables Approach. We propose to
include not one but a sequence of hash tables whose
sizes are defined by the consecutive powers of two.
Thus, immediately after having placed the encoded
public key, the sender encodes a hash table of length
one, followed (if needed) by a hash table of length
two, of length four, etc., until all the entry points are
placed. The unpopulated slots are filled with random
bits. To decrypt a PURB, a recipient decodes the
public key X , derives the ephemeral secret, computes
the hash-index for the first table (which is always
one), and tries to decrypt the corresponding entry
point. In case of a failure, the recipient moves on to
the second hash table, seeks the correct position and
tries again, and so on. In the following, we formalize
the scheme.
Definition. Let r be the number of recipients where
each owns a key pair from (Y1, y1), ..., (Yr, yr). The
sender generates a fresh key pair (x,X) and computes
one ephemeral secret Zi = KDF(Yi
x) per recipient.
Then, the sender encrypts the data and creates r en-
try points ENZ1(K,meta), ..., E
N
Zr
(K,meta). The entry
points are placed in hash table i using the formula
position=H(Zi) mod 2
i−1, where H is a standard
hash function; the sender iteratively tries to place the
entrypoint in HT0, HT1, · · · , until one placement suc-
ceed (i.e., in the absence of collision). If the placement
fails in the last hash table HTi, the sender creates an-
other hash table HT(i + 1) of size 2i−1. An example
of a PURB encrypted for five recipients is shown in
Figure 4.
encoded pk HT0 HT1 HT2 payload
N Hide(X) ENZ1(K) E
N
Z3
(K) ENZ4(K) E
N
K (data)
ENZ2(K) random
ENZ5(K)
random
Figure 4: A PURB with hash tables of increasing
sizes (HT0, HT1, HT2). The five slots of the hash ta-
bles are filled with entry points and two slots are filled
with random bit strings. The “meta” inside the en-
try points is omitted from the figure due to the space
constraints. Hash tables are put one after another in
the byte representation (Appendix, Fig 14).
Similarly, the recipient (a) reads the public key,
(b) derive the shared secret Zi, and (c) iteratively try
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matching positions in hash tables until the decryption
of the entry point succeeds. Although neither the re-
cipient, nor anyone else initially knows the number
of hash tables in a PURB, the recipient needs to do
only a single expensive public-key operation, and the
rest are cheap symmetric-key decryption trials.
Security Argument. The combination of the public
key with multiple entry points is essentially the multi-
recipient IES [34, 9] that has been proven ind$-cca
secure [9] under the same assumptions as the single-
recipient IES. The multi-recipient IES does not im-
pose an ordering of symmetrically encrypted chunks
to be sure; hence the hash-tables layout does not af-
fect the security guarantees. The adversary is un-
able to distinguish entry points from an “empty”
hash-table position filled with random bits, as E is
ind$-cpa secure. Finally, the adversary is unable to
determine the total number of the hash table in a
PURB (up to a bound given with the size of the
PURB), as both the encrypted payload and the IES
are indistinguishable from random bits and, hence,
from each other. See details in Appendix A.4.
Efficiency Argument. In the common case of a sin-
gle recipient, then only a single hash table of size 1
exists, and the header is compact. With r recipients,
the worst-case compactness is having r hash tables
(if each insertion leads to a collision), which happens
with exponentially decrasing probability. In all cases,
the recipient finds his entry point in log2 r attempts.
3.5 Multiple Public Keys and Suites
In the real world, not all data recipients might use the
same cipher suites. For example, users might prefer
different key lengths or use public-key algorithms in
different groups. We extend our encoding scheme to
support the encryption of data for different cipher
suites.
When a PURB is multi-suite encrypted, the re-
cipients need a way to learn whether a given suite
has been used and where the encoded public key of
this suite is located in the PURB. Two possible ap-
proaches to enable recipients to distinguish the differ-
ent suites are to place the public keys linearly in the
beginning of a PURB or to set a fixed byte position
for each defined suite. Both approaches incur undesir-
able overhead. In the former case, the recipients have
to check all possible byte ranges by performing an
expensive public-key operation for each, whereas the
latter approach results in a significant space overhead
and lack of agility, as unused fixed positions have to
be filled with random bits and removing or adding
cipher suites requires redefining the positions set to
other suites.
Set of Standard Positions. To address this chal-
lenge, we introduce a set of standard positions per
suite. These sets are public and standardized for all
PURBs. The set refers to positions where the suite’s
public key could be in the PURB, starting just af-
ter the nonce. For instance, let us consider a suite
PURB X25519 AES128GCM SHA256 that defines G, Π,
and KDF respectively. We can define – arbitrarily for
now – the set of positions as {0, 64, 128, 1024}. As the
length of the encoded public key is fully defined by
the suite (32 bytes here, since Curve25519 is used),
the recipients will iteratively try to decode a public
key at [0:32], then [64:96], etc. The actual values of
the positions are not capital for the idea presented,
and hence we further detail them in Appendix C.
Thus, if the sender wants to encode a PURB for
two suites A and B, she needs to find one posi-
tion in each set such that the public keys do not
overlap. For instance, if setA = {0, 64, 1024} and
setB = {0, 32, 64, 128}, and the public keys’ lengths
are 64 and 32, respectively, one possible choice would
be to put the public key for suite A in [0:64], and the
public key for suite B in [64:96]. We note that both
suites A and B have the position 0 in their set: in
the common case where the PURB is encoded only
for one suite, the encoded public key is simply at
the beginning of the blob, just after the nonce, as in
the previous design where the suite was fixed. With
well-designed sets (that have non-overlapping posi-
tions for any pair of two suites), there exists a way
for the sender to encode a PURB for any number
of suites. We address efficiency hereunder; addition-
ally, we provide a concrete example with real suites
in Appendix C.
Overlapping Layers. We now explain the relation-
ship between the position of the entry point hash ta-
bles and the public keys. In short, they overlap; an
allowed position for a suite can refer to some bits that
can be used by something else, be it another public
key, an entry point, or even the payload. Conceptu-
ally, a PURB is made of overlapping layers: One layer
is composed of the hash tables for the entry points,
one layer is for the payload, and each suite has its
own layer of its public key’s positions. Recall that the
sender first builds the public keys’ layers. Then, the
sender creates and places entry points. Some entries
of the hash tables can be already (partially) occupied
by a public key. In this case, the sender proceeds as
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described before: She either moves to the next hash
table or creates a new one of twice the size if it does
not yet exist, and places the entry point later. The
payload is placed right after the last encoded pub-
lic key or entry point, so that it never collides with a
value in the header. As the recipient performs trial de-
cryption, she eventually finds the correct public key
and entry point. The position of the payload is in-
cluded in the entry point.
encoded
pkA
HT0 HT1 HT2 payload
N Hide(XA) rnd Hide(XB) E
N
Z2
(K) ENK (data)
ENZ1(K) random
ENZ3(K)
random
Figure 5: Example of a PURB encoded for three pub-
lic keys in two suites (suite A and B). The sender
generates one ephemeral key pair per suite (XA and
XB). In this example, the public key for suite A is
placed at the first allowed position, and the public
key for suite B moves to the second allowed position
(since the first position is taken by suite A). Those
positions are public and fixed for each suite. HT0 can-
not be used for storing an entry point, as the public
key for suite A partially occupies it; HT0 is consid-
ered “full” and the entry point is placed in subsequent
hash tables - here HT1.
Decoding Efficiency. Decoding efficiency, however,
still does not match our system goal: For a given
cipher suite, a recipient has to do several expensive
public-key operations, one for each public key’s po-
sition until the correct position is found. We reduce
this overhead to only a single public-key operation
per suite by removing the need to know which of
the suite positions actually has public key placed. We
achieve this by requiring a sender to XOR bytes at all
the suite positions and to place the result into one of
them. The sender first constructs the whole PURB as
before, then she substitutes the bytes of the already
written encoded public key with the XOR of bytes at
all the defined suite positions (if they do not exceed
the PURB length). To decode a PURB, a recipient
starts by reading and XORing the values at all the
positions defined for a suite; this results in an encoded
public key, if the suite has been used in this PURB.
For an example, please refer to Figure 5.
Security Argument. Let us consider first the con-
tent of a PURB, without taking into account its
structure. The content can be separated into four
components: groups of data for each suite, random
fillings, the nonce, and the payload. Each group of
suite’s public key and related entry points is the
multi-recipient IES that is ind$-cca secure. If the
components were laid out sequentially, they repre-
sent a concatenation of ind$-cca/ind$-cpa secure
ciphertexts and random bits. We argue that, as in
§3.4, selecting a special order of ciphertext’s chunks
done by the sender does not give a potential adver-
sary any additional advantage. In fact, it makes the
guessing game harder for the adversary, as the game
with PURBs of indeterministic structure reduces to
the game with sequentially laid out components by
revealing the structural information to the adversary.
See the detailed argument in Appendix A.5.
3.6 Overall Encoding Algorithm
The algorithm is as follows: A sender (a) reserves
space for a chosen public key’s position per suite, (b)
she lays out all the hash-table layouts of entry points
for all the suites, (c) she lays out and encrypts the
file’s contents (or its first substantial-size chunk of
data in the streaming case), (d) she encrypts all the
entry points containing session keys and related meta-
data into appropriate positions in respective hash ta-
bles, (e) she fills all remaining unreserved space in the
whole variable-length header with random bits, and
finally (f) she XOR-encodes the public key values.
The detailed algorithm is in Appendix B.
Key Points. Despite the complexity of the encod-
ing, we emphasize that in the common case where a
PURB is encoded for one suite and one recipient, the
algorithm falls back to the simpler compact construc-
tion; and it also seamlessly supports multiple recip-
ients and suites. Due to the trial-decryption step, a
third-party without decryption key is unable to dif-
ferentiate between these variants (e.g., a short header
and a long payload, or a longer header and a shorter
payload), thus achieving zero leakage (except the to-
tal length, addressed in §4).
3.7 Sender Authentication
In PURBs, a sender generates an ephemeral key pair
for every blob. The recipients cannot know the key
pair in advance, hence cannot authenticate the origin.
In some scenarios, it is important to be able to ob-
tain proof that a PURB comes from a certain sender
and that an adversary is unable to impersonate this
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sender. The standard approach for providing this is
to enable sender authentication using a cryptographic
signature scheme.
Assume now that a sender has a long-term iden-
tity key pair, and its public key is known to or can
be retrieved by potential recipients and can be used
to authenticate the sender. The design requirement
is that it is only the legitimate recipients and no ob-
servers who are able to learn and verify the public-key
identity of the sender. Due to this and the fact that
a signature is not guaranteed to be indistinguishable
from random bits, it is not acceptable for the sender
to sign a final PURB and append the resultant signa-
ture. The sender produces a signature on the cleartext
data||sender identity using the long-term identity
key, instead, and forms the unified data||signature
payload that is to be encrypted with E . The sign-
then-encrypt paradigm is secure when the identity of
the PURB creator is covered by the signature [23],
and the signature scheme is secure against existential
forgery attacks. Any legitimate recipient is able to
verify that the data indeed originated at the sender
by checking the signature after decryption.
3.8 Non-malleability
By default, our encoding scheme does not ensure non-
malleability. A typical decoder can only authenticate
the origin and verify that the encrypted payload and
the designated entry point have not been modified en
route. However, if the entry points of other recipients
or random-byte fillings are malformed, the decoder
will not be able to detect this. If an attacker obtains
access to a decoding oracle, he can randomly flip bits
in an intercepted PURB and see whether the oracle
returns a valid decoding. Thus, the attacker might
be able to learn the length of the padded payload,
the header length, and where the designated entry
points are located, which might be undesirable in cer-
tain scenarios. The example of exploiting malleability
is the Efail attacks [42] that tamper with PGP- or
S/MIME-encrypted e-mails that achieve exfiltration
of the plaintext.
The desired approach to ensuring full integrity
would be to pass the PURB header as associated
data (AD) into authenticated encryption of the pay-
load. However, there are two issues: (1) The header
needs to XOR the bytes of the encrypted payload
if some of the potential public key’s positions fall
within the payload range; and (2) the authentication
tag must take into account all the XOR operations
but might fall into a potential public key’s position,
invalidating future decoder computation.
We introduce two modifications that enable us to
provide AD-based integrity. First, the AEAD scheme
used for payload protection must be chosen such that
they follow the encrypt-then-mac generic composition
where associate data is authenticated after the en-
cryption is completed. The suitable scheme classes
are two-pass AEAD schemes, e.g., EAX [11], sponge-
based constructions [14], e.g., NORX [5], and Even-
Mansour based tweakable ciphers [27]. Second, we re-
serve the last t bytes of a PURB, where t is the size
of the integrity tag defined in the cipher suite as a
part of the AEAD scheme, as non-usable for pub-
lic key XOR during decoding. The updated scheme
is as follows. To encode a PURB, a sender begins by
preparing entry points, laying out the header, and en-
crypting the payload. Then, she computes the XOR
value, potentially using the encrypted payload, com-
putes the authentication tag, using the header as AD,
and appends this tag at the end of the PURB. Upon
reception of the PURB, a decoder computes the po-
tential public keys of interest, ignoring the last t bytes
of the PURB, decrypts the payload and verifies the
integrity using the unprocessed header, the payload,
and the tag.
4 Hiding the Ciphertext
Length
The encoding scheme presented in Section 3 pro-
duces blobs of data that are indistinguishable from
random bit-strings of the same length, thus leak-
ing no information to the adversary. However, the
length in itself might reveal information about the
content, and this leakage has already been used ex-
tensively in many traffic-analysis attacks, e.g., on
website fingerprinting [39, 25, 56, 57], video iden-
tification [43, 49, 44], and VoIP traffic fingerprint-
ing [61, 19]. Although solutions involving application-
or network-level padding are numerous, they are typ-
ically designed for their specific problem, and the
more fundamental problem of length-leaking cipher-
texts remains. Some leakage is certainly unavoidable,
but we show how the current padding of block ci-
phers is fundamentally insufficient for efficiently hid-
ing the plaintext length, especially when considering
plaintexts that can differ in size by several orders of
magnitude.
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We introduce Padme´, a novel padding scheme for
PURBs (but not restricted to it): it reduces the
length leakage for a wide range of encrypted data
types. Padme´ asymptotically leaks significantly less
than stream- and block-cipher-encrypted data (which
were not designed for hiding the length but are still
the standard in many cases). Padme´’s overhead de-
creases with the file size, yielding an overhead of at
most 12%, which can be acceptable in most cases.
The intuition behind Padme´ is that instead of group-
ing into fixed-size sets of file lengths (i.e., of 128 or
256 lengths, like block-ciphers do), or in exponentially
growing sets, Padme´ groups files into logarithmically
increasing sets of file lengths.
We emphasize that many defenses already exist in
specific scenarios, e.g., on the topic of website fin-
gerprinting [25, 58], and Padme´ is not claiming to
perform better than those tailored solutions in their
application domain, but rather tries to be a generic
solution for still-unprotected ciphertexts and proto-
cols.
4.1 Definitions
Let |c| be the length of the bit string c.
Leakage. Let c be a ciphertext (padded or un-
padded). We assume the same adversary as in §3,
and we assume that c provides no information to
the adversary except its length |c|. We define as
Leakage(c) = log2(|c|) the number of bits leaked
about the length |c|.
Overhead. Let c′ be the padded version of an un-
padded ciphertext c. We define as Overhead(c′, c) =
|c′| − |c| the number of bits used to pad c into c′.
4.2 Design Criterion
To evaluate the strawman approaches and our pro-
posal Padme´, we design a game where the adver-
sary guesses the plaintext behind a padded encrypted
blob. This game is inspired from the related work
(i.e., defending against a perfect attacker) [58].
Padding Game. Let P denote a collection of plain-
text objects (e.g., data, documents, or application
data units). An honest user chooses a plaintext p ∈ P ,
then pads and encodes it into a PURB c. We con-
sider that the adversary knows almost everything: all
possible plaintext P , the PURB c and the param-
eters used to generate it (e.g., number of recipients
and schemes). The adversary does not know the pri-
vate inputs or any decryption keys corresponding to
c. The goal of the adversary is to guess the plaintext
p based on the observed PURB c of length |c|.
4.3 Strawman Padding Approaches
In this section, we present two strawman designs. We
will define each time a padding function f : N → N
that yields the padded size given the plaintext length.
For simplicity, we talk in terms only of lengths, and
write L as the original length and L′ as the padded
length, with L′ ← f(L).
Given the aforementioned adversary, it is clear
that f cannot be one-to-one, otherwise the adver-
sary could trivially inverse it and recover p. We have
the choice of whether it should be one-to-many (i.e.,
f(L) = L + r, r picked at random) or many-to-one
(i.e., grouping several L’s into buckets of size L′).
In this work, we opt for the many-to-one approach
as the one-to-many approach is (1) not determinis-
tic, (2) leaks more information when encoding sev-
eral times the same ciphertext, (3) requires a source
of randomness, and (4) is arguably harder to analyze.
Strawman 1: Fixed-Size Blocks.We consider us-
ing f(L) = b · ⌈L/b⌉, where b is a block size. This
is how block ciphers operate, hence how many ob-
jects get “padded” in real life (e.g., in Tor cells). In
this case, the PURB’s size is a multiple of b, thereby
the maximum overhead is b − 1, and the leakage is
O(log L/b).
Unfortunately, this approach exhibits the problem
mentioned in the introduction of this section: When
considering plaintexts whose size differs by several
orders of magnitude, there is no good value for b that
would accommodate all the plaintexts. For instance,
consider b = 1MB: Padding small files and network
messages would incur a large overhead, e.g., Tor’s
cells are 512B long and padding them to 1MB would
incur a maximum overhead of 2000×. In contrast,
padding a 700MB movie with at most 1MB of chaff
would only add a little confusion to the adversary,
as this movie can still be distinguishable from others.
Hence, to reduce the information leakage about the
length, the padding should depend on the file size.
Strawman 2: Padding to the Nearest Power of 2.
As the fixed-size blocks fail to accommodate a wide
range of plaintexts, the next logical step is to have
varying-size blocks. We introduce this strawman as a
basis for comparing our actual scheme. The intuition
is that for small plaintexts, the blocks would be
small too (yielding a modest overhead), whereas for
larger files, blocks would be larger, yielding again an
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appropriate trade-off in terms of leakage-to-overhead
ratio.
If we try to have bucket bi with a varying size,
a na¨ıve way of doing so is to follow powers of 2,
i.e., with bi = 2
i (we discuss later the powers of
x > 2). Henceforth, we refer to this strawman as
Next power of 2. We obtain
f(L) = 2⌈log L⌉
The leakage of this scheme is O(log logL) (see Ap-
pendix, Lemma 1). The maximum overhead of this
scheme is almost +100% (e.g., a 17 GB Blu-Ray
movie would be padded into 32 GB). For powers of
x > 2, we obtain less leakage by having more over-
head, e.g., a scheme padding to the nearest power of 3
has the overhead of at most +200%, with lesser leak-
age than before, but still in O(log logL). Although
our second strawman has the desirable characteris-
tic of the overhead depending on L, we conclude this
class of padding has an unacceptable overhead to be
used in practice, independently of x.
4.4 Padme´
We now describe our padding scheme Padme´, which
limits the information leakage about the length of the
plaintext for wide range of encrypted data sizes. Sim-
ilarly to the previous strawman, Padme´ also asymp-
totically leaks O(log logL) bits of information, but its
overhead is much lower (at most 12% and decreasing
with L).
Intuition. Consider the previous strawman, where
L is padded to the next power of two. The only per-
missible padded lengths are of the form 2n, and the
information that leaks is n, i.e., in which bucket the
plaintext is. This value n can be represented in a bi-
nary floating-point number, over ⌊log(n) + 1⌋ bits of
exponent and 0 bits of mantissa.
In Padme´, we follow the same idea where the
permissible padded length is represented as a bi-
nary floating-point number, but we additionally al-
low the mantissa to be at most as long as the expo-
nent (see Table 6). This doubles the number of bits
used to represent the allowed padded length – and
doubles the absolute leakage – but allows for more
fine-grained buckets, reducing the overhead. Asymp-
totically, Padme´ leaks the same number of bits (with
an extra factor 2), but reduces its overhead by al-
most 10× (from +100% to +12%). More importantly,
the buckets sizes now grow logarithmically with re-
spect to L, instead of growing exponentially as in
Next power of 2. Thus, the overhead in percent-
age is decreasing with L.
⌊log(n) + 1⌋-bit exponent 0-bit mantissa
In the strawman Next power of 2, the allowed
length 2n can be represented as a binary floating-
point number with no mantissa and ⌊log(n) + 1⌋ bits
of exponent.
⌊log(n) + 1⌋-bit exponent ⌊log(n) + 1⌋-bit mantissa
Figure 6: Padme´ represents lengths as floating-point
numbers, allowing the mantissa to be of at most
⌊log(n) + 1⌋ bits.
Algorithm. To compute the padded size L′ and to
ensure that it fits in a floating-point representation of
at most 2×⌊log(n) + 1⌋ bits, we enforce the last E−S
bits to be 0, where E = ⌊log(L)⌋ is the value of the
exponent, and S = ⌊log(E) + 1⌋ is the size of its bi-
nary representation. The reason for the substraction
will become clear later. For now, we demonstrate how
E and S are computed in Table 1.
Table 1: The IEEE floating-point representations of 8,
9 and 10. The value 8 has 1 bit of mantissa (the initial
1 is omitted), and 2 bits of exponents; 9 has a 3-bits
mantissa and a 2-bit exponent, while the value 10 as 2
bits of mantissa and exponents. Padme´ enforces the
mantissa to be no longer than the exponent, hence 9
gets rounded up to the next permitted length 10.
L L E S IEEE representation
8 0b1000 3 2 0b1.0 * 2ˆ0b11
9 0b1001 3 2 0b1.001 * 2ˆ0b11
10 0b1010 3 2 0b1.01 * 2ˆ0b11
Recall that Padme´ enforces that the bit length of
the mantissa is no longer than the bit length of the
exponent. In Table 1, for the value L = 9 the mantissa
is longer than the exponent – intuitively, it is “too
precise” – and 9 is therefore not a permitted padded
length. But, in contrast, the value 10 is; thus, a 9
bit-long ciphertext would be padded into 10 bits.
To understand why Padme´ enforces the E−S bits
to be 0, it suffices to realize that enforcing the last E
bits to 0 is equivalent to padding to the next power
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Figure 7: Maximum overhead with respect to the
plaintext size L. The na¨ıve approach to pad to the
next power of two has a constant maximum over-
head of 100%, whereas Padme´’s overhead is decreas-
ing with L, following 12 logL .
of two. In comparison, Padme´ allows S extra bits to
represent the padded size, with S defined as the bit
length of the exponent.
We provide a precise definition of the procedure in
Algorithm 1. Once the padded size L′ is computed, a
PURB plaintext of length L is simply padded with
L′ − L 0’s (to be precise, we suggest following the
compact padding scheme ISO/IEC 7816-4:20052).
Algorithm 1: Padme´
Data: length of content L
Result: length of padded content L′
E ← ⌊logL⌋ ;
S ← ⌊logE⌋+ 1 ;
l← E − S ; // # of bits to set to 0
m← (1≪ l)− 1 ; // l 1’s in the LSB
L′ ← L+m; // round up
L′ ← L′ & ∼m; // set to 0 the last bits
Leakage and Overhead. By design, the leakage is
O(log logL), which is apparent from the length of the
binary representation of the leaked information. As
we fix E − S bits to 0 and round up, the maximum
overhead is 2E−S−1. As a percentage, the maximum
overhead can be estimated as follows:
max overhead =
2E−S − 1
L
<
2E−S
L
=
2⌊logL⌋−⌊log logL⌋−1
L
=
1
2 · 2log logL
=
1
2 · logL
[%]
(1)
2https://www.iso.org/standard/36134.html
Thus, Padme´’s overhead in percentage decreases
with respect to the file size L. The max overhead is
+11.11%, when padding a 9-bit file into 10 bits. For
bigger files, the overhead is smaller.
On Optimality.We note that there is no sweet spot
on the leakage-to-overhead curve, and we could easily
enforce the last 12 · (E − S) bits to be 0 (instead of
the last E − S bits) to reduce overhead and increase
leakage. Still, the relation that matters in practice is
between L and the overhead. We show in §5.2 how
this choice performs with various datasets.
5 Evaluation
Our evaluation is two-fold: First, we show the per-
formance and overhead of the PURB encoding and
decoding; second, using several datasets, we show
how Padme´ facilitates hiding information about data
length.
5.1 Performance of the PURB Encod-
ing
The main question we answer in the evaluation of
the encoding scheme is whether it has a reason-
able cost, in terms of both time and space overhead,
and whether it scales gracefully with an increasing
number of recipients and/or cipher suites. First, we
measure the average CPU time required to encode
and decode a PURB. Then, we compare the decod-
ing performance with the performance of plain and
anonymized OpenPGP (described below) schemes.
Finally, we show how the compactness of the header
changes with multiple recipients and suites, as a per-
centage of useful bits in the header.
Anonymized PGP. In standard PGP, the identity
– more precisely, the public key ID – of the recipi-
ent is embedded in the header of the encrypted blob.
This plaintext marker speeds up decryption, but en-
ables a third party to enumerate all data recipients.
In the so-called anonymized or “hidden” version of
PGP [18, Section 5.1], this key ID is substituted with
zeros. In this case, the recipient tries sequentially the
encrypted entries of the header with her keys. We use
the hidden PGP variant as a comparison for PURBs,
which also does not indicate key IDs in the header
(but uses a more efficient structure). We note that
the hidden PGP variant still leaks the cipher suites
used, the total length, and other plaintext markers
(version number, etc.).
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5.1.1 Implementation
We implemented a prototype of the PURBs’ encod-
ing and padding schemes in Go. The implementation
covers the base encoding scheme without sender au-
thentication and PURB non-malleability, and it con-
sists of 2 kLOC. Our implementation relies on the
open-source Kyber library3 for cryptographic oper-
ations, because to the best of our knowledge, it is
the only crypto library in Go that implements the
Elligator-encoding for points on Curve25519.We pro-
vide a tool that is easily integrable with existing so-
lutions. However, our code is only a proof-of-concept
and has not yet gone through the necessary harden-
ing, e.g., against timing attacks, etc.
Reproducibility. All datasets, the source code for
PURBs and Padme´, as well as scripts for reproduc-
ing all experiments, are available in the main reposi-
tory4.
5.1.2 Methodology
We ran the encoding experiments on a consumer-
grade laptop, with a quad-core 2.5 GHz Intel Core
i7 processor and 8 GB of RAM, using Go 1.10. To
compare with an OpenPGP implementation, we use
Keybase’s fork5 of the default Golang crypto library6,
as the fork adds support for the ECDH scheme on
Curve25519.
We further modify the Keybase’s implementation
to add the support for the anonymized OpenPGP
scheme. The PURBs’ suite used in all the encoding
experiments is based on Curve25519. If more than
one suite is needed for an experiment, we use copies
of Curve25519 to ensure homogeneity across timing
experiments. For each data point, we generate a new
set of keys, one per recipient. We measure each data
point 20 times, using each time fresh randomness.
5.1.3 Results
Encoding Performance. In this experiment, we
first evaluate how the time required to encode a
PURB changes with a growing number of recipients
and cipher suites. Second, how main computational
components contribute to this duration. We logically
divide the total time into three components. The first
is the generation and Elligator-encoding of sender’s
3https://github.com/dedis/kyber
4https://github.com/dedis/purbs
5https://github.com/keybase/go-crypto
6https://github.com/golang/crypto
public keys, one per suite. A public key is derived
by multiplying a base point with a freshly generated
private key (scalar). If the resultant public key is not
encodable, which happens in half of the cases, a new
key is generated. Point multiplication dominates this
component constituting ˜90% of the total time. The
second is the derivation of a shared secret with each
recipient, essentially a single point-multiplication per
recipient. We denote the third component as Other :
It includes all the operations that are not in the first
or second components, namely encryption of the en-
try points and payload, hash table placement, etc.
We consider three cases: using one, three or ten cip-
her suites. When more than one cipher suite is used,
the recipients are equally divided to support those.
Figure 8a shows that in the case of a single re-
cipient, the generation of a public key and the com-
putation of a shared secret dominate the total time
and takes ˜4ms and ˜3ms, respectively. Generating
a public key takes longer on average, due to the need
of regenerating in 50% of the cases due to encoding
failures. As expected, computing shared secrets starts
dominating the total time when the number of recip-
ients grows, whereas the duration of the public-key
generation only depends on a number of cipher suites
used. The encoding is arguably efficient for most cases
of communication, as even with hundred recipients
and ten suites, the time for creating a PURB stays
under 0.4 seconds.
Decoding Performance. We measure the worst-
case CPU time required to decipher a standard PGP
message, a PGPmessage with hidden recipients, a flat
PURB that has a flat layout of entry points with-
out hash tables, and a standard PURB. The suite
with Curve25519 is used in all the PGP and PURBs
schemes.
Figure 8b shows the results. The OpenPGP library
uses the assembly-optimized Go elliptic library for
point multiplication, thus the multiplication takes
˜0.05-0.1 ms there, whereas it takes ˜2.5-4 ms in Ky-
ber. This results in a significant difference in absolute
values for small numbers of recipients. But our pri-
mary interest is the dynamics of total duration. The
total time increase for anonymous PGP is linear be-
cause, in the worst case, a decoder has to derive as
many shared secrets as there are recipients. Whereas,
PURBs exhibit almost constant time, due to a sin-
gle multiplication needed, regardless of the number
of recipients. A decoder still has to perform multiple
entry-point trial decryptions, but one such operation
would account for only ˜0.3% of the total time (in
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Figure 8: Performance of PURBs Encoding.
the single-recipient, single-suite scenario). The advan-
tage of using hash tables, hence logarithmically less
symmetric-key operations, is illustrated by the dif-
ference between PURBs standard and PURBs flat,
which is noticeable after 100 recipients.
Header Compactness. We analyze the compact-
ness of the header. We recall that in comparison with
placing linearly the different elements in the header,
our design with growing hash tables is less compact
but it enables more efficient decoding (an example of
this trade-off is in Figure 8b, PGP hidden vs. PURBs
standard).
We represent, in Figure 8c, compactness, or the
percentage of the PURB header that is filled with
actual data, with respect to the number of recipi-
ents and cipher suites. Not surprisingly, an increas-
ing number of recipients and/or suites increases the
collisions and reduces compactness; 50% for 100 re-
cipients and 1 suite, 40% for 100 recipients and 10
suites. A typical header size is around 4 KB in that
case (Appendix, Figure 15), out of which 2 KB are
useful data. More importantly, in the most common
case of having one recipient in one suite, the header
is perfectly compact. Finally, there is a trade-off be-
tween compactness and efficient decryption: compact-
ness can be easily increased by resolving linearly the
collisions of entry points (instead of directly moving
to the next hash table). The downside is that the
recipient has more entry points to try.
5.2 Performance of Padme´
When reviewing a padding scheme, one important
metric is the incurred overhead, in terms of bits added
to the plaintexts. By design, Padme´’s overhead is
Table 2: Datasets used in the evaluation of anonymity
provided by Padme´.
Dataset # of objects
Ubuntu packages 56,517
YouTube videos 191,250
File collections 3,027,460
Alexa top 1M Websites 2,627
bounded by 12·logL . As discussed in §4.4, Padme´ does
not escape the typical overhead-to-leakage trade-off,
hence the novelty of Padme´ does not lie in the trade-
off of 12·logL overhead, O(log logL) leakage. Rather, it
lies in the relation between L and the overhead, and
Padme´’s overhead is at most +12%.
A more interesting question is whether given an ar-
bitrary collection of plaintexts P , Padme´ would hide
well which plaintext is padded. Padme´ was designed
to work with an arbritrary collection of plaintexts P .
It remains to be seen how Padme´ performs when ap-
plied to a specific set of plaintexts P , i.e., with a dis-
tribution coming from the real world, and to establish
how well it groups files into sets of identical length.
In the next section, we experiment with four datasets
made of various objects: a collection of Ubuntu pack-
ages, a set of YouTube videos, a set of user files, and
a set of Alexa Top 1M websites.
5.2.1 Datasets and Methodology
The Ubuntu dataset contains 56,517 unique packages,
parsed from the official repository of a live Ubuntu
16.04 instance; as packages can be referenced in mul-
tiple repositories, we filtered the list by name and ar-
chitecture. The reason for padding Ubuntu software
14
updates is that the knowledge of updates enables a lo-
cal eavesdropper to build a list of packages and their
versions that are installed on a machine. If some of
the packages are outdated and have known vulnera-
bilities, an adversary might use it as an attack vector.
A percentage of software update still occurs over un-
encrypted connections, which is still an issue; but en-
crypted connections to software-update repositories
also expose which distribution and the kind of up-
date being done (security / restricted7 / multiverse8
/ etc). We hope that this unnecessary leakage will
disappear in the near future.
The YouTube dataset contains 191,250 unique
videos, obtained by iteratively querying the YouTube
API. One semantic video is generally represented by
2 − 5 .webm files, corresponding to various video
qualities. Hence, each object in the dataset is a
unique (video, quality) pair. We use this dataset as
if the videos were downloaded in bulk rather than
streamed; that is, we pad the video as a single file.
The argument for padding YouTube videos as whole
files is that as shown by related work [43, 49, 44],
variable-bitrate encoding combined with streaming
leak which video is being watched. If YouTube wanted
to protect the privacy of its users, it could re-
encode everything to constant-bitrate encoding and
still stream it, but then the total length of the stream
would still leak information. Alternatively, it could
adopt a model like the iTunes store, where videos
have variable bit-rate but are bulk-downloaded; but
again, the total downloaded length would leak infor-
mation, requiring some padding. Hence, we explore
how unique the YouTube videos are with and with-
out padding.
The files dataset was constituted by collecting
the file sizes in ‘/home/user/’ of 10 co-workers and
contains 3,027,460 of both personal files and config-
uration files. These files were collected on machines,
running Fedora, Arch, and MacOSX. The argument
for analyzing the uniqueness of those files is not to
encrypt each file individually (often, there is no point
in hiding the metadata of a file if the file location
exposes everything about it, e.g. ‘/home/user/.ssh’),
rather to quantify the privacy gain when padding
those objects.
Finally, the Alexa dataset is made of 2,627 web-
sites from the Alexa Top 1M list. The size of each
website is the sum of all the resources loaded by
the webpage, which has been recorded by piloting a
7Contains proprietary software and drivers.
8Contains software restricted by copyright.
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Figure 9: Distribution of the sizes of the objects in
each dataset.
‘chrome-headless’ instance with a script, mimicking
real browsing. One reason for padding whole web-
sites – as opposed to padding individual resources –
is that related work in website fingerprinting showed
the importance of the total downloaded size [25]. The
effectiveness of Padme´ when padding individual re-
sources, or for instance bursts [58], is left as an inter-
esting future work.
5.2.2 Evaluation of Padme´
The distribution of the objects sizes for all the
datasets is shown in Figure 9. Intuitively, it would be
harder for an efficient padding scheme to build groups
of same-sized files when there are large objects in the
dataset. Therefore, we expect the last 5% to 10% of
the four datasets to remain somewhat unique, even
after padding.
For each dataset, we analyze the “anonymity”
(more precisely, the size of the anonymity sets) for
each object. To compute this metric, we group ob-
jects by their size, and report the distribution of the
sizes of these groups. A large number of small groups
would indicate that many objects in the dataset
are easily identifiable solely by their sizes. For each
dataset, we compare three different approaches: the
Next power of 2 strawman, Padme´, and padding
to a fixed block size (of 512B, like a Tor cell). The
anonymity metrics are shown in Figure 10, and the
respective overheads are shown in Table 3. We first
notice that for all these datasets, despite contain-
ing very different objects, only ˜50% of the objects
have a unique size; only ˜85% of the YouTube videos
have a unique size (Figure 10a), and only ˜80% of
the Ubuntu packages (Figure 10c). These characteris-
tics persist in the traditional block-cipher encryption
(blue dashed curves) where objects are only padded
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to a block size. Even after being padded to 512 bytes,
the size of a Tor cell, most object sizes remain as
unique as in the unpadded case. We observe similar
results when padding to 256 bits, the typical block
size for AES (not plotted).
Next power of 2 (red dotted curves) provides
the best anonymity: in the ‘YouTube’ and ‘Ubuntu’
datasets (Figures 10a and 10c), there is no single ob-
ject that remains unique with respect to its size, all
belong to groups of at least 10 objects; of course,
we cannot generalize this statement, as shown by the
other two datasets (Figures 10b and 10d). In general,
we see a massive improvements with respect to the
unpadded case. Recall that this padding scheme is
unfortunately rather impractical, adding +100% to
the size in the worst case and +50% in mean; in Ta-
ble 3, we see that the mean overhead is of +45%.
Finally, we see the anonymity provided by Padme´
(green solid curves). By design, Padme´ has an ac-
ceptable maximum overhead (max +12% and de-
creasing). In three of the four datasets, there is a
constant difference between our expensive reference
point Next power of 2 and Padme´; despite hav-
ing a decreasing overhead with respect to L, un-
like Next power of 2. This means that although
larger files have proportionally less protection (i.e.,
less padding in percentage) with Padme´, this is not
critical, as these files are more rare and are harder
to protect efficiently, even with a na¨ıve and costly
approach. The percentage of uniquely identifiable
objects (objects that trivially reveal their plaintext
given our perfect adversary) we observe a signifi-
cant drop by using Padme´: from 83% to 3% for the
‘Ubuntu’ dataset, from 87% to 3% for the ‘Youtube’
dataset, from 45% to 8% for the ‘files’ dataset and
from 68% to 6% for the ‘Alexa’ dataset. In Table 3,
we see that the mean overhead of Padme´ is around
3%, more than an order of magnitude smaller than
Next power of 2. We also see how using a fixed
block size can yield high overhead in percentage, in
addition to insufficient protection.
6 Related Work
Traffic-morphing [62] is a method for hiding the traf-
fic of a specific application by masking it as being pro-
duced by another application and imitating the cor-
responding packet distribution. The tools built upon
this method can be standalone [55] or use the con-
cept of Tor pluggable transport [37, 59, 60] that is
applied to preventing Tor traffic from being identi-
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Figure 10: Analysis of the anonymity provided by
various padding approaches: Next power of 2,
Padme´, padding with a constant block size and no
padding. We measure for each object with how many
other objects it becomes indistinguishable after being
padded, and plot the distribution.Next power of 2
provides better anonymity, at the cost of a drastically
higher overhead (at most +100% instead of +12%).
Overheads are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3: Analysis of the overhead, in percentage, of
various padding approaches. In the first column, we
use b = 512B as block size.
Dataset Fixed block size Next power of 2 Padme´
YouTube 0.01 44.12 2.23
files 40.15 44.18 3.64
Ubuntu 14.09 43.21 3.12
Alexa 36.71 47.12 3.07
fied and censored [17]. There are two fundamental
differences with PURBs, however. First, PURBs fo-
cus on a single unit of data, and do not explore yet the
question of the time-distribution of multiple PURBs.
Second, the traffic-morphing systems, in most cases,
try to mimic a specific transport and sometimes are
designed to only hide the traffic of one given tool.
Whereas PURBs are universal and arguably adapt-
able to any underlying application. Moreover, it has
been argued that most traffic-morphing tools do not
achieve unobservability in real-world settings due to
discrepancies between their implementations and the
systems that they try to imitate, because of the un-
covered behavior of side protocols, error handling, re-
sponse to proving, etc. [31, 54]. We believe that for a
wide class of applications using pseudo-random uni-
form blobs, either alone or in combination with other
lower-level tools, is a potential solution in a different
direction.
Traffic-analysis aims at inferring the contents of en-
crypted communication by analyzing metadata. The
most well-studied application of it is website finger-
printing [39, 25, 56, 57], but it has also been ap-
plied to video identification [43, 49, 44] and VoIP
traffic [61, 19]. In website fingerprinting over Tor,
research has repeatedly showed that the total web-
site size is the feature that helps an adversary the
most [20, 38, 25]. In particular, Dyer et al. [25] show
the necessity of padding the whole website, as op-
posed to individual packets, for preventing an adver-
sary from identifying a website by its observed total
size. They also systematized the existing padding ap-
proaches. Wang et al. [58] proposed deterministic and
randomized padding strategies tailored for padding
Tor traffic against a perfect attacker, which inspired
our §4.
Finally, Sphinx [22] is an encrypted packet format
for Mix networks which aim at minimizing the infor-
mation revealed to the adversary. Sphinx only sup-
ports one cipher suite, and one direct recipient (but
several nested ones, due to the nature of Mix net-
works). We detail the differences in Appendix D. To
the best of our knowledge, PURBs is the first solu-
tion that hides all metadata while providing crypto-
graphic agility.
7 Conclusion
We have presented a universal solution to leaky ci-
phertexts that traditionally left sensitive metadata
unprotected. We have discussed how PGP, TLS, and
a typical disk-encryption scheme leaks information
that could be used by an attacker to perform traf-
fic analysis, website fingerprinting, and inference at-
tacks.
We have argued that the metadata leakage is not
a necessity and have presented PURBs, an approach
for designing encrypted data format that does not
leak anything at all, except the padded length of
the ciphertexts, to anyone without the decryption
keys. We have shown that despite having no clear-
text header, PURBs could be efficiently encoded and
decoded, and could simultaneously support multiple
public keys and cipher suites. We have introduced
Padme´, a padding scheme that reduces the length
leakage of ciphertexts and has a modest decreasing-
with-file-size overhead. It performs significantly bet-
ter than classic padding schemes with fixed block size
in terms of anonymity, and its overhead is asymptot-
ically lower than one of the schemes with exponen-
tially increasing padding.
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Security Arguments
In the following, we define the requirements for the
building blocks of the PURBs encoding scheme and
argue for the security properties of each strawman
from §3.
A.1 Preliminaries
Let λ be a security parameter for cryptographic prim-
itives used in our design. We describe the properties
required from the primitives in terms of λ.
Authenticated Encryption. Let Π = (K, E ,D) be
a deterministic nonce-based authenticated encryp-
tion (AE) scheme [10, 48] where K : K
$
← {0, 1}λ,
ENK (m) and D
N
K(c) are the key generation, encryp-
tion and decryption algorithms respectively, given a
message m, a ciphertext c, and a nonce N , such
that DNK (E
N
K (m)) = m or D
N
K (cˇ) = ⊥ if cˇ is a
forged ciphertext. We require all AE schemes used in
PURBs to be ind$-cpa secure, i.e., the encryption
output, including an authentication tag, must be in-
distinguishable from random bits under an adaptive
chosen-plaintext-and-IV attack as formalized by Ro-
gaway [48]. In addition, the AE scheme is required to
be int-ctxt secure [10], i.e., it must be computation-
ally infeasible to produce a ciphertext not previously
produced by the sender.
Nonce. A nonce in Π must be randomly drawn from
Nonce = {0, 1}λ for every PURB. Using a counter
or the last block of a previous ciphertext would not
suffice, as it would enable an adversary to link related
ciphertexts.
Public-Key Algorithms. Let G be a cyclic finite
group of a prime order generated by the group ele-
ment g where the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
problem is hard to solve for a polynomial-time ad-
versary. G can, for example, be an elliptic curve
or an integer group. We enforce that G provides a
level of security of λ bits. Adopting multiplicative
notation, we define the key generation algorithm as
KeyGen(G, λ) : x
$
← {0, ..., |G|}, X ← gx.
Public-Key Hiding. We require G to have a map-
ping from a group element to a binary string that
is indistinguishable from a random bit string of the
same length. The examples of such mapping tech-
niques are Elligator [13] for Curve1174 [13] and
Curve25519 [12], less compact but suitable for a
broader range of curves Elligator Squared [50, 4] (e.g.,
for the BN curves [6]), and public-key steganogra-
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phy [52] for integer groups. We formalize the mapping
as Hide: G(1λ) → {0, 1}λ and Unhide: {0, 1}λ →
G(1λ).
Key Derivation Function. Let KDF : G(1λ) →
{0, 1}λ be a key derivation function [33] that con-
verts a group element into a bit string that can be
used as a symmetric key. A secure KDF must have at
least all the properties of a secure cryptographic hash
function. SHA-256 is an example of a suitable KDF.
Password-Based Key Derivation Function. Let
PBKDF : {salt, password} → {0, 1}λ be a secure
password-based key derivation function [41], a vari-
ant of KDF that takes a password and a salt as the
input and outputs a bit string suitable to be used as
a key in symmetric encryption. A PBKDF must have
all the properties of a secure KDF. Argon2 [15] is an
example of a secure PBKDF.
A.1.1 Adversary and Security Goals.
An adversary A is a programwith access to a PURBs
oracle O where O either returns a requested PURB
or a random bit string of the same length. To analyze
the security of PURBs, we mimic the experiment-
based find-then-guess approach [8, 2], such that A
submits a chosen messagem and possibly public keys
of the recipients to O and attempts to guess whether
the oracle’s response is an actual PURB or a random
string. Our goal is to achieve the ind$-cpa notion
of indistinguishability. We define A’s advantage in a
given experiment as
Advind$-cpa
PURBs (A) = Pr(Exp
ind$-cpa
PURBs (A) = 1)−
1
2
To achieve the indistinguishability, we require
Advind$-cpa
PURBs (A) = negl(λ).
A.2 Single Passphrase
Consider the following experiment Exp1ind$-cpa
PURBs :
Exp1
ind$-cpa
PURBs
m← A(find)
c← AO(m)
b˜ = A(guess, c)
If b˜ = b then
return 1
return 0
Oracle O(m)
Input: Sˆ,Π,G, PBKDF
salt
$
← {0, 1}λ; S ←
PBKDF(salt, Sˆ)
N
$
← Nonce; K
$
← {0, 1}λ
PURB0 = N ||salt||E
N
S (K)||E
N
K (m)
PURB1 = {0, 1}
|PURB0|
b
$
← {0, 1}
return PURBb
In Exp1, A chooses a message m and queries O with
it. Π,G, PBKDF and a password Sˆ are the inputs to
O such that Sˆ is unknown to A. A generates a ran-
dom salt, nonce N and key K, derives the ephemeral
secret S, and creates a PURB as described in §3.2.
Then, O flips a coin to decide whether to respond to
A with the created PURB or a random bit string of
the same length. Upon receiving O’s response, A tries
to guess what outcome the coin flip has had.
The PURB is composed of four segments: N , salt,
and the two AE ciphertexts. For A to have a non-
negligible advantage in the experiment, it suffices to
distinguish one of the segments from a random string
or to find a correlation between any two of the seg-
ments. N and salt are randomly drawn or generated
by O, and the two AE segments, jointly with N , are
required to be ind$-cpa secure by design. The same
nonce is used in the both encryptions but such a reuse
has been proven secure [9, Section 9] as long as the
nonce is used with different keys. Thus, all the seg-
ments of the PURB are individually indistinguish-
able from random bits. A only can succeed in finding
a correlation between salt and the entry point, or the
entry point and the payload if A is able to recover S or
K from E or to recover K as plaintext bits of the en-
try point which all would imply breaking the security
properties of the used primitives. Thus, we conclude
that the adversary’s advantage in the experiment is
negligible.
A.3 Single Public Key, Single Suite
In Exp2, the adversary A chooses m and also a public
key Y (without the knowledge of the private key y)
for the PURB to be encrypted for and queries the
oracle O with these two values. O is modified such
that it creates a PURB according to §3.3. A attempts
to distinguish the PURB from a random string as in
Exp1.
Exp2
ind$-cpa
PURBs
(y, Y ) ←
KeyGen(G)
m← A(find, Y )
c← AO(Y,m)
b˜ = A(guess, c, Y )
If b˜ = b then
return 1
return 0
Oracle O(Y,m)
Input: Π,G, KDF
N
$
← Nonce; K
$
← {0, 1}λ
(x,X)← KeyGen(G)
Z ← KDF(Y x)
PURB0 =
N ||Hide(X)||ENZ (K)||E
N
K (m)
PURB1 = {0, 1}
|PURB0|
b
$
← {0, 1}
return PURBb
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The encoded public key and the entry point practi-
cally form a ciphertext of the IES (§2.2) that is proven
to be ind$-cca secure [2], i.e., has even stronger secu-
rity properties than we require. The only difference
of PURBs’ encoding from the original IES is that
we use an AE scheme instead of the generic encrypt-
then-mac composition but both approaches, if secure,
provide the same security guarantees [16]. Moreover,
the public-key hiding scheme ensures that Hide out-
put is indistinguishable from random bits, and any
random string maps to some group element. Hence,
the advantage of A is negligible.
A.4 Multiple Public Keys, Single
Suite
Let O now be the oracle that constructs multi-
recipient PURBs of the flat layout, i.e., without the
hash-tables structure. In Exp3 (see Figure 11), the
adversary A chooses r public keys, instead of one,
and submits them to O, along with a message m. O
constructs a PURB where the entry points for the
recipients are placed sequentially after the encoded
public key and followed by the encrypted payload. As
before, O flips a coin to choose whether to respond
with the PURB or a random string.
Semantics. The only difference between the con-
structed PURB and a single-recipient PURB is that
the public key is now combined with multiple entry
points. This combination of the public key with mul-
tiple entry points is essentially the multi-recipient IES
that has been proven ind$-cca secure [9] under the
same assumptions as the single-recipient IES, hence
as the payload encryption is ind$-cpa secure, the en-
coding is still ind$-cpa secure.
Layout. Consider now that O constructs the PURB
with the hash-tables layout and fills the empty entries
with random bits. We argue that there is no advan-
tageous difference for A: As the multi-recipient IES
scheme [34, 9] does not impose any particular order of
symmetrically-encrypted segments for its security, O
is allowed to rearrange Y1, ..., Yr without affecting in-
distinguishability. In particular, O can choose the or-
der defined by the hash tables. Additionally, O needs
to add random strings at the PURB positions that
correspond to empty hash-tables entries. But such
random strings are indistinguishable to A from an
entry point, as entry points are encrypted with an
ind$-cpa secure scheme. Hence, this does not give A
any additional information. Finally, we note that A
is not able to learn where the hash tables end and
the payload starts, as the encrypted header and the
payload are indistinguishable from each other (both
are indistinguishable from a random string).
Subset of Keys. In reality, the adversary might not
know precisely for which keys a PURB is encrypted.
To model this situation, the oracle O could decide
on a subset of the provided by the adversary keys
for which to encrypt the PURB. For instance, O
could flip coins to decide whether a given public key is
used for encryption, or otherwise fill the correspond-
ing space with random bits. We argue that this game
is harder for the adversary. In fact, the experiment
where O picks a random subset of the public keys re-
duces to Exp3 if we give the adversary the knowledge
of the subset. Since A cannot win with significant
advantage Exp3, he also does not have a significant
advantage in this variant.
Legitimate Recipients. So far, we have only con-
sidered an adversary who does not have a valid de-
cryption key. In the multi-key scenario, privacy of a
recipient from other recipients of the same PURB is
also a security goal. We argue that an adversary A∗
who is one of the PURB recipients only learns either
the total number of the recipients or the upper-bound
of this number but not their identites. Indeed, if Π
is ind$-cpa secure, A∗ is unable to validate which
other hash-tables entries are actual encryptions and
which are random-bit fillings, or to retrieve other’s
ephemeral keys, even though A∗ knows the plaintext
and can try all byte ranges as potential ciphertexts.
What A∗ does know is the position of the payload,
hence the beginning and end position of each hash
table. By design of the hash-table structures, A∗ is
able to draw a lower and upper bound on the num-
ber of recipients. When this is a concern, this can be
fixed simply by adding dummy recipients.
We further argue that A∗ cannot learn the identity
of another recipient: Even if A∗ was able to retrieve
some ephemeral secret Zi from an encrypted entry
point, A∗ would not be able to obtain the pre-KDF
value as long as KDF is pre-image resistant. And even
obtaining the pre-KDF value would not enable A∗ to
learn the identity of the recipient i due to the DDH
assumption.
A.5 Multiple Public Keys and Suites
Consider an experiment where an adversary
A selects several different cipher suites (we
do not restrict the exact number) and queries
the oracle O with public keys of these suites
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Exp3
ind$-cpa
PURBs
(y1, Y1), ..., (yr, Yr)← KeyGen(G)
m← A(find, Y1, ..., Yr)
c← AO(Y1,...,Yr,m)
b˜ = A(guess, c, Y1, ..., Yr)
If b˜ = b then
return 1
return 0
Oracle O(Y1, ..., Yr,m)
Input: Π,G, KDF
N
$
← Nonce; K
$
← {0, 1}λ
(x,X)← KeyGen(G)
Z1 ← KDF(Y
x
1 ), ..., Zr ← KDF(Y
x
r )
PURB0 = N ||Hide(X)||E
N
Z1
(K)||...||ENZr (K)||E
N
K (m)
PURB1 = {0, 1}
|PURB0|
b
$
← {0, 1}
return PURBb
Figure 11: Exp3.
Exp4
ind$-cpa
PURBs
(y1, Y1), ..., (yr, Yr)← KeyGen(G)
(yˇ1, Yˇ1), ..., (yˇrˇ, Yˇrˇ)← KeyGen(Gˇ)
...
(y˜1, Y˜1), ..., (y˜r˜, Y˜r˜)← KeyGen(G˜)
m← A(find, (Y1, ..., Yr), (Yˇ1, ..., Yˇrˇ), ..., (Y˜1, ..., Y˜r˜))
c← AO((Y1,...,Yr),(Yˇ1,...,Yˇrˇ),...,(Y˜1,...,Y˜r˜),m)
b˜ = A(guess, c, (Y1, ..., Yr), (Yˇ1, ..., Yˇrˇ), ..., (Y˜1, ..., Y˜r˜))
If b˜ = b then
return 1
return 0
Oracle O((Y1, ..., Yr), (Yˇ1, ..., Yˇrˇ), ..., (Y˜1, ..., Y˜r˜),m)
Input: Π,G, KDF, Πˇ, Gˇ, ˇKDF, ..., Π˜, G˜, ˜KDF
N
$
← Nonce; K
$
← {0, 1}λ
(x,X)← KeyGen(G)
Z1 ← KDF(Y
x
1 ), ..., Zr ← KDF(Y
x
r )
(xˇ, Xˇ)← KeyGen(Gˇ)
Zˇ1 ← ˇKDF(Yˇ
xˇ
1 ), ..., Zˇrˇ ← ˇKDF(Y
xˇ
rˇ )
...
(x˜, X˜)← KeyGen(G˜)
Z˜1 ← ˜KDF(Y˜
x˜
1 ), ..., Z˜r˜ ← ˜KDF(Y
x˜
r˜ )
PURB0 = N ||Hide(X)||E
N
Z1
(K)||...||ENZr (K)||
Hide(Xˇ)||EN
Zˇ1
(K)||...||EN
Zˇrˇ
(K)||
||...||
Hide(X˜)||EN
Z˜1
(K)||...||EN
Z˜r˜
(K)||ENK (m)
PURB1 = {0, 1}
|PURB0|
b
$
← {0, 1}
return PURBb
Figure 12: Exp4.
(Y1, ..., Yr), (Yˇ1, ..., Yˇrˇ), ..., (Y˜1, ..., Y˜r˜), where r, rˇ, ..., r˜
are the numbers of public keys in each suite, re-
spectively, along with a message m. We consider O
that constructs a simplified version of the PURB
structure presented in §3.5. In this simplified version,
the PURB is encoded without hash tables and
XORing of the encoded public keys. Instead, O
places linearly an encoded public key, followed by all
related entry points (i.e., in the same suite), followed
by another public key in another suite and its entry
points, and so on (see PURB0 in Figure 12). This
variant helps A: it is equivalent to the real scheme
presented in §3.5 when A is additionally provided
with the structural information (all values are the
same, only their layout is now better known by A).
This simplified structure is a concatenation of the
multi-recipient IES ciphertexts. As each of these
ciphertexts is ind$-cca secure, their concatenation
is ind$-cca secure too (recall that reusing the same
nonce with different keys is a secure practice [9,
Section 9]).
Now, due to the same argument as in Ap-
pendix A.4, enforcing O to construct the PURB with
the hash tables (instead of laying out the entry points
linearly) does not affect the indistinguishability guar-
antee: (1) the entry points and the public key form
a ciphertext of the IES scheme that is ind$-cca se-
cure [34, 9] and does not impose a particular order
on the segments; hence, arranging the entry points
in the hash-table layout does not affect security, and
(2) the adversary is unable to differentiate the ran-
dom fillings from the actual encrypted values (as E is
ind$-cpa secure).
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The remaining difference is the XOR of publicly-
known positions yielding an encoded public key (in-
stead of the public key being positioned linearly in the
header). Like a recipient, A can perform the XOR of
the bytes located at the standardized positions and
obtain “candidates” for the encoded public keys of
each suite. However, given our assumption on Hide,
any bit string is a likely candidate, and A cannot
distinguish between a random looking value and an
actual encoded public key. Regardless, even with the
certainty of having found an encoded public key, the
adversary is unable to derive the shared secrets with-
out the appropriate secret key.
Legitimate Recipients.We argue that the game in
the case of a multi-recipient multi-suite PURB is at
least as hard for the legitimate-recipient adversary
A∗ as it is for A∗ in Appendix A.4. If A∗ was given
the information on which hash-tables entries are oc-
cupied by the entry points of the suite that A∗ uses
or by random fillings and which are by other suites’
data, the experiment would fall back to the scenario
of Appendix A.4, in which we have shown the scheme
to be secure. Moreover, A∗ is not even able to obtain
this additional information, as A∗ is unable to distin-
guish the values of other suites from a random string,
without valid decryption keys.
B Algorithms
The creation of a PURB is presented in two successive
steps: Encode and Layout. In Encode, the sender
derives all necessary values for the PURB header
(i.e., the shared secrets, ephemeral public keys, etc).
In Layout the sender lays out those elements in a
byte array.
Encode is decomposed into two algorithms: En-
code with Passphrases (Algorithm 4) is used for
encrypting data with long-term passphrases, and En-
code for Public Keys (Algorithm 5) is used for
public keys.
This division is made purely for simplicity, as intu-
itively Encode handles all cryptography, while Lay-
out (Algorithm 6) consists purely of data structure
operations. Similarly, the separation between En-
code with Passphrases and Encode for Public
Keys is made for simplicity, and our source code4
consists of a single algorithm that can handle a com-
bination of passphrases and public keys at the same
time (this is visible in the Layout algorithm which ac-
cepts simultaneously entry points and cornerstones).
B.1 Preliminaries
Let || denote string concatenation, and let
$
← S de-
note that a value is drawn at random from the set S.
We denote by |value| the bit-length of “value”.
Array notation. We denote by a← [] the fact that
a is an empty array. We denote by a[i : j] ← b, the
operation of copying the bits of b at the positions
a[i], a[i+ 1], · · ·a[j − 1]. When written like this, b al-
ways has correct length of j − i bits, and we assume
i < j. If, before an operation a[i : j]← b, |a| < j, we
first grow a to length j. We sometimes write a[i :]← b
instead of a[i : |b|]← b.
In the Layout algorithm, we use a “reserva-
tion array”, which is an array with a method ar-
ray.isFree(start,end) that returns True iff none of the
bits array[i], array[i + 1], · · · array[j − 1] were previ-
ously assigned a value, and False otherwise.
B.2 Performance
Let N be the number of recipients using symmetric
keys (N = |Sˆ1 · · · SˆR|) andM be the number of recip-
ients using public keys (M = |(Y1,G1) · · · (YR,GR)|).
TheEncode with Passphrases algorithm runs in
O(N), with PBKDF being the most expensive opera-
tion, while Encode for Public Keys runs in O(M),
with the point multiplication being the most expen-
sive operation, runs twice (KeyGen + in the argument
of KDF).
The Layout algorithm runs in O(M ·
|Allowed Positions|+N2), with |Allowed Positions|
being a public constant - a typical value could be
6, as we show in Appendix C - and N2 being the
worst-case estimate for inserting N entrypoints in
the hash-tables. Consequently, the overall complexity
for Layout is in O(M +N2), and the amortized cost
is O(M +N log(N)).
Without showing an actual algorithm or proof here,
creating a PURB with passphrases and for public
keys and encoding it to bytes is done in O((N +
M) log(N+M)). This can be derived from the source
code4 with the full algorithm.
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Algorithm 4: Encode with Passphrases
Input : λ, Data, long-term secrets Sˆ1 · · · Sˆr
Output: Nonce, EncodedKeys[],EntryPoints[], Payload
N
$
← {0, 1}λ ;
K
$
← {0, 1}λ ;
Payload ← EN
K
(Data) ;
EntryPoints ← [] ;
for Sˆi ∈ Sˆ1 · · · Sˆr do
// derive ephemeral shared secret
S ← PBKDF(N, Sˆi) ;
// encrypt payload key with S
ep ← EN
S
(K);
EntryPoints.push(ep) ;
end
return N , [], EntryPoints, Payload
Algorithm 5: Encode for Public Keys
Input : λ, Data, public keys (Y1,G1) · · · (Yr ,Gr)
Output: Nonce, EncodedKeys[],EntryPoints[], Payload
N
$
← {0, 1}λ ;
K
$
← {0, 1}λ ;
Payload ← EN
K
(Data) ;
EncodedKeys ← [] ;
EntryPoints ← [] ;
for (Yi,Gi) ∈ (Y1,G1) · · · (Yr ,Gr) do
// generate ephemeral key pair
(x,X)← KeyGen(Gi, λ) ;
// derive ephemeral shared secrets
Z ← KDF(Y x) ;
// encrypt payload key with Z
ep ← EN
Z
(K);
EntryPoints.push(ep) ;
// encode the public key X
c← Hide(X) ;
EncodedKeys.push(c) ;
end
return N , EncodedKeys, EntryPoints, Payload
Algorithm 6: Layout
Input : Nonce, EncodedKeys[], EntryPoints[],
GroupsAllowedPositions
Output: byte[]
layout[0:] ← Nonce ;
publickey positions = [] ;
// find positions for public keys
while EncodedKeys not empty do
(pk, G) ← EncodedKeys.pop() ;
allowed positions ← GroupsAllowedPositions(G) ;
for pos ∈ allowed positions do
if layout.isFree(pos.start, pos.end) then
// mark as used in the layout
layout[pos.start:pos.end] ← pk ;
// remember where the public key goes
publickey positions.push(array(pk, G, pos)) ;
break ;
end
end
end
// place entrypoints in hash tables
while EntryPoints not empty do
entrypoint ← EntryPoints.pop() ;
hash table len = 1 ;
hash table start = Nonce.length ;
while True do
// position the in current hash table
index = Hash(entrypoint) % hash table len ;
start = hash table start ;
end = start + index * entrypoint len ;
if layout.isFree(start, end) then
layout[start:end] ← entrypoint ;
break ;
end
// if not free, double hash table size
hash table length *= 2 ;
hash table start += hash table len *
entrypoint len ;
end
end
// compute the padding, append to layout
padding length ← Padme´ (|layout| + |Payload|) ;
padding
$
← {0, 1}padding length ;
layout.append(Payload || padding) ;
// XOR trick for efficient decoding
for (G, pk, pos) ∈ publickey positions do
buffer = pk ;
for pos2 ∈ GroupsAllowedPositions(G) do
buffer = buffer ⊕ layout[pos2.start : pos2.end] ;
end
layout[pos.start:pos.end] ← buffer ;
// now
⊕
GroupsAllowedPositions(G) = pk
end
return layout
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C Allowed Positions for Cor-
nerstones
The goal of this section is to give a possible example
of the “set of allowed positions for the suites” in the
PURB encoding. We emphasize that finding an op-
timal set of positions was not the focus of this work.
The intention is to show that such sets exist and to
give a concrete example (which is used for the com-
pactness experiment, Figure 8c).
Example. We use the required and recommended
suites in the latest draft of TLS 1.3 [45] as an example
of suites a PURB should support. The suites and
groups are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Suites and groups described in the latest
draft of TLS1.3.
Symmetric/Hash Algorithms
TLS AES 128 GCM SHA256 Required
TLS AES 256 GCM SHA384 Recommended
TLS CHACHA20 POLY1305 SHA256 Recommended
TLS AES 128 CCM SHA256 Optional
TLS AES 128 CCM 8 SHA256 Optional
Key Exchange Groups
secp256r1 Required
x25519 Recommended
secp384r1 Optional
secp521r1 Optional
x448 Optional
ffdhe2048 Optional
ffdhe3072 Optional
ffdhe4096 Optional
ffdhe6144 Optional
ffdhe8192 Optional
We note that the PURB concept of
“suite” regroups both “suite” and “group”
in TLS. For instance, a PURB suite could be
PURB AES 128 GCM SHA 256 SECP256R1. We
describe possible suites given the TLS suites and
groups in Table 6. For the sake of simplicity, we
introduce aliases in the table, and will further refer
to those suites as suite A-F.‘ In Table 5, we show a
possible assignment. For instance, if only suites A
and C are used, the public key for A would be placed
in [0, 64], while value in [96, 160] is changed so that
the XOR of [0, 64] and [96, 160] equals the key for
B. We provide a simple python script to design such
sets in the code repository.
Table 5: Example of Allowed Positions per suite.
Here, the algorithm simply finds any mapping so that
each suite can coexist in a PURB. The receiver must
XOR between 1 and 6 values to find the Cornerstone.
Suite Possible positions
A {0}
B {0, 64}
C {0, 96}
D {0, 32, 64, 160}
E {0, 64, 128, 192}
F {0, 32, 64, 96, 128, 256}
D Sphinx packet format
The Sphinx packet format [22] is an encrypted for-
mat specifically designed for mix-networks. In mix-
networks, the most critical requirement is bit-wise
unlinkability of messages after mixing, which can be
achieved via re-encryption (to be more precise, onion-
decryption) of the message. The payload and the full
path is typically hidden from a single mix, but some
“metadata” (e.g., the full length of the path, distinc-
tion between forward and backward messages) could
be visible to an adversary. Typical considerations of
compactness and efficiency also exists, and the au-
thors claim that designing an efficient packet format
was still an open problem.
Although the application scenario is different,
Sphinx shares similarities with PURBs: it is a format
for encrypted data aiming at controlling the informa-
tion leaked to the adversary. They differ in the fact
that Sphinx is built for mix-networks, and must keep
its properties with multiple “hops” of re-encryption,
whereas PURBs is purely between a sender and one
or more receivers.
The threat model considered by Sphinx is of an
active adversary that controls the network but not
all mixes. The requirements on the Sphinx format
are as follows: (1) bit-wise unlinkability at each hop,
(2) hiding the number of hops, (3) no distinctions
between forward and backward messages, (4) resists
active tagging attacks.
We show the Sphinx packet format in Figure 13,
and now compare its structure with PURBs in the
corresponding case of a single recipient, in a single
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Table 6: PURB Suites. “Suite A” is a shorthand for the first suite.
Alias PURB Suite |Cornerstone| [B] |EntryPoint| [B]
A PURB AES 128 GCM SHA 256 SECP256R1 64 48
B PURB AES 128 GCM SHA 256 X25519 32 48
C PURB AES 256 GCM SHA 384 SECP256R1 64 80
D PURB AES 256 GCM SHA 384 X25519 32 80
E PURB CHACHA20 POLY1305 SHA 256 SECP256R1 64 64
F PURB CHACHA20 POLY1305 SHA 256 X25519 32 64
α β γ δ
DH Group
Element
Header MAC payload
Figure 13: A simplified visualization of the Sphinx
packet format
group (see Figure 3). Both format embed a Diffie-
Hellman group element, only mapped to random bits
in the case of PURBs.
The inner structure of the Sphinx header β share
little similarities with PURBs, since its main con-
struction is for preserving length across several onion-
decryption. At a higher level, β is the output of
a stream cipher and leaks nothing (but its length)
without its key s0. In the PURB, the corresponding
“header” is ENZ (K,meta) that is the output of a block
cipher. Like s0, the key Z is the shared secret derived
from the group element and the receiver’s private key.
In Sphinx, β is integrity-protected by a MAC γ
keyed with s0, which leaks no information without s0.
In PURBs, the header and the payload are both pro-
tected with a single AEAD construction keyed with
the payload key. Similarly, without the appropriate
key, this leaks no information to a third party. In
Sphinx, the payload is not integrity protected. Since
the LIONESS cipher is non-malleable, any bit flip in
the payload, any information contained is lost.
The PURB starts with a nonce that is not explic-
itly specified in the Sphinx paper [22] but is likely
needed in concrete implementations [3].
We note that in the case of Sphinx, the group used
for Diffie-Hellman and the cipher suite (LIONESS)
used for the payload are fixed (and hence this infor-
mation is “leaked”).
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E Leakage & Padding
E.1 Next Power of 2
As mentioned in the body of the paper, we prove here
that padding to the next power of two yields a leakage
and a overhead in O(log logL).
Lemma 1: Padding with buckets bi following 2
i (or,
equivalently, padding using f(L) = 2⌈log2 L⌉) yield an
overhead of O(log logL).
Proof 1: The information we are leaking is in which
bucket the plaintext landed. To compute how much
bit of information this represents, we compute the
number of buckets n needed to accommodate con-
tents of size up to L. Since the buckets’ sizes are
powers of two, dictated by bi = 2
i, we obtain:
n∑
i=0
2i ≥ L
2n+1 ≥ L
n ≥ log2(L− 1)− 1
n ≈ O(logL)
Hence, there are n buckets in the range [0;L]. Since
we leak the number n, we leak log2(n) or O(log logL)
bits. The same reasoning can be used to show the
overhead, also in O(log logL).
F Additional Figures
Figure 14: Visualization of how the hash ta-
bles are mapped to a byte array. In this
example, the byte representation would be
N ||Hide(X)||ENZ1(K)||rnd||E
N
Z1
(K)||rnd||rnd||ENZ1(K)||rnd||E
N
K (data).
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Figure 15: Header size with respect to number of re-
cipients, for 10 suites. The “PURBs flat” curve corre-
sponds to header elements being laid out sequentially,
without growing hash tables that speed up decoding.
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